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This paper studies the interaction between macroprudential and monetary policies using a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model. The model features a housing market. There are borrowers, who
need collateral to obtain loans, and savers. Monetary policy is conducted following a Taylor rule for
the interest rate. The macroprudential policy is represented by a Taylor-type rule for the loan-to-
value ratio reacting to output and house prices. Results show that introducing the macroprudential
rule or extending the interest rate rule to respond to house prices increases welfare, since it enhances
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"One of the most challenging issues relating to systemic risk management is the appropriate interac-
tions between macroprudential and monetary policy. To what extent, if at all, should monetary policy be
used to mitigate systemic risk? And to what extent, if at all, should monetary policy be coordinated with
macroprudential supervision? These issues are the subject of intense debate among policymakers across
the globe". Janet L. Yellen, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, October 11, 2010.
1 Introduction
After the recent nancial crisis, policy makers have realized that the traditional policies were not enough
to avoid such episodes and that should be complemented with a new direction of policy interventions. As
a result, several institutions have implemented macroprudential tools in order to explicitly promote the
stability of the nancial system in a global sense, not just focusing on individual companies. The goal
of this kind of regulation would be to avoid the transmission of nancial shocks to the broader economy.
Some examples of macroprudential tools are asset-side tools (loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratio
caps), liquidity-based tools (countercyclical liquidity requirements) or capital-based tools (countercyclical
capital bu¤ers, sectoral capital requirements or dynamic provisions).
However, this new set of macroprudential policies has to coexist with traditional policies, namely
monetary policy. It is crucial to analyze how the new macroprudential measures a¤ect the conduction
of monetary policy and to monitor and evaluate those policies, making sure that they do not work at
cross-purposes. The objective of this paper is to study the interaction between macroprudential and
monetary policy.
A very important research question that we cover in this paper is whether monetary and macropru-
dential policies could complement each other or if the central bank, could use its interest rate instrument
to foster nancial stability. Some would argue that the conduct of macroprudential and monetary pol-
icy should be closely coordinated, even integrated, and then, that both macroprudential and monetary
policy should be assigned to the central bank. In this case, the objectives of monetary policy should be
expanded to include nancial stability (Eichengreen, Rajan, and Prasad (2011), Eichengreen, El-Erian,
Fraga, Ito et al. (2011)). Some others would think that macroprudential supervision should involve
other regulatory agencies and the central bank should keep the only responsibility of maintaining price
stability, retaining its independence. Then, monetary policy and nancial-stability policy should be seen
as di¤erent policies with di¤erent objectives and di¤erent instruments.
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In our study, we focus on a specic macroprudential instrument; the loan-to-value ratio (LTV). The
Group of Thirty (2010), a working group on macroprudential policy, recommends in its inuential report,
that the macroprudential supervisor considers an adjustable LTV ratio that could be varied to inhibit
the swings of the economic cycle. Following this line, our model imposes a limit on borrowing, that is,
loans need to be collateralized by a proportion of the value of the assets that the borrower owns. This
proportion can be interpreted as an LTV. The macroprudential tool we consider is to introduce a rule
that automatically increases loan-to-values when there is a boom, therefore limiting the expansion of
credit.
In this paper, we propose an implementation of the macroprudential policy which is analogous to
how monetary policy is conducted. In particular, we assume that the same way that the central bank
follows a Taylor rule for monetary policy, the macroprudential authority also follows a linear rule to carry
out the macroprudential policy. The monetary policy literature has extensively shown that simple rules
result in a good performance; therefore it seems sensible to apply this kind of rules to macroprudential
supervision (see, for instance, Yellen, 2010).
The objectives of the monetary and the macroprudential authority should include output, ination
and nancial stability. In order to achieve these objectives, monetary policy uses the interest rate as an
instrument while the macroprudential authority uses the LTV. However, there is not consensus about
which institution should be in charge of which objectives. It is clear that monetary policy cares about
ination and output stabilization but the debate on whether its objectives should also include nancial
stability is still open.
In this paper, we assume that the objective of the central bank is to maintain output and ination
stabilization. Therefore, in a standard way, the central bank will follow a Taylor rule in which the
interest rate is set responding to ination and output. Nevertheless, in order to add to the debate, we
will also consider the case of an extended Taylor rule for monetary policy which responds to house prices
as well, including among the objectives of the central bank to also maintain nancial stability.
On the other hand, the macroprudential regulator aims at avoiding systemic risk and excessive credit
growth. The IMF (2013) states that a macroeconomic environment which gives rise to credit growth will
contribute to the build-up of systemic risk. Therefore, booms that lead to increase in borrowing should
be moderated. They also consider that a rise in house prices can act as a leading indicator of excessive
credit growth since they lead to wealth e¤ects that permit the increase in borrowing. Then, following
this lines, we propose that the macroprudential regulator follows a Taylor-type rule in which the LTV
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responds to house prices and output.
We use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with features a housing market
in order to evaluate the e¤ects on the main macroeconomic variables and on welfare of a rule on the
LTV interacting with a Taylor rule for monetary policy. We consider three types of Taylor rules: a
simple one that responds only to ination; a standard rule that responds to ination and output; and
an extended rule that responds additionally to house prices. The modelling framework consists of an
economy composed by borrowers and savers. This microfounded general equilibrium model allows us to
explore all the interrelations that appear between the real economy and the credit market. Furthermore,
such a model can deal with welfare-related questions.
Our paper is related to the strand of research that, following Iacoviello (2005), introduces a rule
on the LTV interacting with monetary policy. For instance, Borio and Shim (2007) emphasizes the
complementary role of macroprudential policy to the monetary policy and its supportive role as a built-
in stabilizer. As well, NDiaye (2009) shows that the monetary policy can be supported by countercyclical
prudential regulation. Angelini, Neri and Panetta (2012) shows interactions between LTV and capital
requirements ratios and monetary policies; they nd that the macroprudential policies are most helpful
to counter nancial shocks that lead the credit and asset price booms. In a similar way, Kannan, Rabanal
and Scott (2012) examines a monetary policy rule that reacts to prices, output and changes in collateral
values with a macroprudential instrument based on the LTV; they remark the importance of identifying
the source of the shock of the housing or price boom when assessing policy optimality. We contribute
to this literature by analyzing the e¤ects of macroprudential policies on welfare disentangled among
di¤erent Taylor rules and explicitly showing the optimality of the policy mix when the two authorities
act in a coordinated way.
From a positive perspective, our results show that when the LTV rule operates in the economy,
booms are moderated because a tighter limit on credit is set. However, the goals of the macroprudential
regulator and the central bank are in conict when shocks come from the supply side. Furthermore, the
central bank, by an appropriate combination of parameter values in the Taylor rule, could do the job of
a macroprudential regulator. Nonetheless, the goals of the central bank should be extended to not only
to keeping ination low but also to have a stable nancial system.
Within this framework, we evaluate di¤erent scenarios in terms of welfare. We study how welfare
changes when the macroprudential policy is introduced in the economy and conclude that this new
policy is welfare enhancing. We also study if the central bank could act as a macroprudential regulator
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by introducing house prices in the interest rate rule. We nd that even if the central bank could do
the job of a macroprudential regulator by using the interest rate to stabilize house prices, and therefore
the nancial system, optimal policy analysis suggests that it is preferable to leave this objective to a
macroprudential regulator with a di¤erent instrument to maximize welfare.
We also conclude that welfare gains are maximized when the central bank aims at stabilizing ination,
responding only to prices and output, and the macroprudential regulator cares about nancial stability,
responding to output and more strongly to house prices.
The rest of the paper continues as follows: Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 presents results
from simulations. Section 4 o¤ers a welfare analysis of the di¤erent policies. Section 5 nds the optimal
parameter combination. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model Setup
The economy features patient and impatient households, a nal goods rm, and a central bank which
conducts monetary policy. Households work and consume both consumption goods and housing. Patient
and impatient households are savers and borrowers, respectively.1 Borrowers are credit constrained and
need collateral to obtain loans. The representative rm converts household labor into the nal good.
The central bank follows a Taylor rule for the setting of interest rates.
2.1 Savers
Savers maximize their utility function by choosing consumption, housing and labor hours:
max
Cs;t;Hs;t;Ns;t
E0
1X
t=0
ts

logCs;t + jt logHs;t   (Ns;t)



;
where s 2 (0; 1) is the patient discount factor, E0 is the expectation operator and Cs;t, Hs;t and
Ns;t represent consumption at time t, the housing stock and working hours, respectively. 1= (   1) is
the labor supply elasticity,  > 0: jt represents the weight of housing in the utility function. We assume
that log (jt) = log(j)+uJt, where uJt follows an autoregressive process. A shock to jt represents a shock
to the marginal utility of housing. These shocks directly a¤ect housing demand and therefore can be
interpreted as a proxy for exogenous disturbances to house prices.
Subject to the budget constraint:
1Notice that the absolute size of each group is one.
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Cs;t + bt + qt (Hs;t  Hs;t 1) = Rt 1bt 1
t
+ ws;tNs;t + Ft; (1)
where bt denotes bank deposits, Rt is the gross return from deposits, qt is the price of housing in
units of consumption, and ws;t is the real wage rate. Ft are lump-sum prots received from the rms.
The rst order conditions for this optimization problem are as follows:
1
Cs;t
= sEt

Rt
t+1Cs;t+1

; (2)
wst = (Ns;t)
 1Cs;t; (3)
jt
Hs;t
=
1
Cs;t
qt   sEt 1
Cs;t+1
qt+1: (4)
Equation (2) is the Euler equation, the intertemporal condition for consumption. Equation (4)
represents the intertemporal condition for housing, in which, at the margin, benets for consuming
housing equate costs in terms of consumption. Equation (3) is the labor-supply condition.
2.2 Borrowers
Borrowers solve:
max
Cb;t;Hb;t;Nb;t
E0
1X
t=0
tb

logCb;t + jt logHb;t   (Nb;t)



;
where b 2 (0; 1) is impatient discount factor, subject to the budget constraint and the collateral
constraint:
Cb;t +
Rt 1bt 1
t
+ qt (Hb;t  Hb;t 1) = bt +Wb;tNb;t; (5)
Rtbt = ktEtqt+1Hb;tt+1; (6)
where bt denotes bank loans and Rt is the gross interest rate. kt can be interpreted as an LTV. The
borrowing constraint limits borrowing to the present discounted value of their housing holdings. The
6
rst order conditions are as follows:
1
Cb;t
= bEt

Rt
t+1Cb;t+1

+ tRt; (7)
wb;t = (Nb;t)
 1Cb;t; (8)
jt
Hb;t
=
1
Cb;t
qt   bEt

1
Cb;t+1
qt+1

  tktEt (qt+1t+1) : (9)
where t denotes the multiplier on the borrowing constraint.2 These rst order conditions can be
interpreted analogously to the ones of savers.
2.3 Firms
2.3.1 Final Goods Producers
There is a continuum of identical nal goods producers that operate under perfect competition and
exible prices. They aggregate intermediate goods according to the production function
Yt =
Z 1
0
Yt (z)
" 1
" dz
 "
" 1
; (10)
where " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. The nal good rm chooses
Yt (z) to minimize its costs, resulting in demand of intermediate good z:
Yt (z) =

Pt(z)
Pt
 "
Yt: (11)
The price index is then given by:
Pt =
Z 1
0
Pt (z)
1 " dz
 1
" 1
: (12)
2.3.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
The intermediate goods market is monopolistically competitive. Following Iacoviello (2005), intermediate
goods are produced according to the production function:
2Through simple algebra it can be shown that the Lagrange multiplier is positive in the steady state and thus the
collateral constraint holds with equality.
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Yt (z) = AtNs;t (z)
Nb;t (z)
(1 ) ; (13)
where  2 [0; 1] measures the relative size of each group in terms of labor. This Cobb-Douglas production
function implies that labor e¤orts of constrained and unconstrained consumers are not perfect substitutes.
This specication is analytically tractable and allows for closed form solutions for the steady state of
the model. This assumption can be economically justied by the fact that savers are the managers of
the rms and their wage is higher than the one of the borrowers.3
At represents technology and it follows the following autoregressive process:
log (At) = A log (At 1) + uAt; (14)
where A is the autoregressive coe¢ cient and uAt is a normally distributed shock to technology. We
normalize the steady-state value of technology to 1.
Labor demand is determined by:
ws;t =
1
Xt

Yt
Ns;t
; (15)
wb;t =
1
Xt
(1  ) Yt
Nb;t
; (16)
where Xt is the markup, or the inverse of marginal cost.4
The price-setting problem for the intermediate good producers is a standard Calvo-Yun setting. An
intermediate good producer sells its good at price Pt (z) ; and 1  ;2 [0; 1] ; is the probability of being
able to change the sale price in every period. Agents that are not able to change prices keep them xed.
The optimal reset price P t (z) solves:
1X
k=0
()k Et

t;k

P t (z)
Pt+k
  "= ("  1)
Xt+k

Y t+k (z)

= 0: (17)
where "= ("  1) is the steady-state markup.
The aggregate price level is then given by:
3 It could also be interpreted as the savers being older than the borrowers, therefore more experienced.
4Symmetry across rms allows us to write the demands without the index z:
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Pt =
h
P 1 "t 1 + (1  ) (P t )1 "
i1=(1 ")
: (18)
Using (17) and (18) ; and log-linearizing, we can obtain a standard forward-looking New Keynesian
Phillips curve bt = Etbt+1  bxt+ut, that relates ination positively to future ination and negatively
to the markup (   (1  ) (1  ) =). ut is a normally distributed cost-push shock.5
2.4 Monetary Policy
We consider a generalized Taylor rule which responds to ination, output and house prices:
Rt = (Rt 1)
 
(t)
(1+R )

Yt
Y
Ry qt
q
Rq
R
!1 
"Rt; (19)
where 0    1 is the parameter associated with interest-rate inertia, and R  0; Ry  0; Rq  0
measure the response of interest rates to current ination, output and house prices, respectively. "Rt is
a white noise shock with zero mean and variance 2" . The reason for considering this generalized Taylor
rule is that by making the central bank respond to house prices, we are giving the institution a way
to implement a macroprudential policy. Notice that increasing the interest rate whenever house prices
increase is restricting credit booms in the economy.
2.5 A Macroprudential Rule for the LTV
In standard models, the LTV ratio is a xed parameter which is not a¤ected by economic conditions.
However, we can think of regulations of LTV ratios as a way to moderate credit booms. When the
LTV ratio is high, the collateral constraint is less tight. And, since the constraint is binding, borrowers
will borrow as much as they are allowed to. Lowering the LTV tightens the constraint and therefore
restricts the loans that borrowers can obtain. Recent research on macroprudential policies has proposed
Taylor-type rules for the LTV ratio so that it reacts inversely to variables such that the growth rates of
GDP, credits, the credit-to-GDP ratio or house prices. These rules can be a simple illustration of how
a macroprudential policy could work in practice. We assume that the objective of the macroprudential
regulator is to avoid situations that lead to an excessive credit growth; when there is a boom in the
economy or house prices increase, agents borrow more. Therefore, we take output and house prices as
leading indicators of credit growth and consequently consider a Taylor-type rule for the LTV ratio, so
5Variables with a hat denote percent deviations from the steady state.
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that it responds to output and house prices:6
kt = kSS

Yt
Y
 ky qt
q
 kq
; (20)
where kSS is a steady state value for the loan-to-value ratio, and ky  0; kq  0 measure the response of
the loan-to-to value to output and house prices, respectively. This kind of rule would deliver a lower LTV
ratio in booms, when output and house prices are high, therefore restricting the credit in the economy
and avoiding a credit boom derived from good economic conditions.
2.6 Market Clearing
The market clearing conditions are as follows:
Yt = Cs;t + Cb;t: (21)
The total supply of housing is xed and it is normalized to unity:
Hs;t +Hb;t = 1: (22)
3 Simulation
3.1 Parameter Values
The discount factor for savers, s, is set to 0.99 so that the annual interest rate is 4% in steady state.
The discount factor for the borrowers is set to 0.98.7 The steady-state weight of housing in the utility
function, j, is set to 0.1 in order for the ratio of housing wealth to GDP to be approximately 1.40 in the
steady state, consistent with the US data. We set  = 2, implying a value of the labor supply elasticity
of 1.8 For the parameters controlling leverage, we set kSS to 0.90, in line with the US data.9 The labor
6For simplicity, and given that there is neither consensus nor empirical evidence on smoothing, to reduce the number
of parameters to optimize, we opt for disregarding the smoothing parameter in the LTV rule, as in Kannan et al. (2012),
Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014) and Funke and Paetz (2012).
7Lawrance (1991) estimated discount factors for poor consumers at between 0.95 and 0.98 at quarterly frequency. We
take the most conservative value.
8Microeconomic estimates usually suggest values in the range of 0 and 0.5 (for males). Domeij and Flodén (2006) show
that in the presence of borrowing constraints this estimates could have a downward bias of 50%.
9See Iacoviello (2014).
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income share for savers is set to 0.64, following the estimate in Iacoviello (2005).10 For the Taylor rule,
we consider three cases which we call "the simple Taylor rule", "the Taylor rule," and "the extended
Taylor rule." The simple Taylor rule only responds to ination, so that R = 0:5;
R
y = 0;
R
q = 0, the
Taylor rule, corresponds to a standard case in which R = 0:5;
R
y = 0:5;
R
q = 0 and the extended
Taylor rule in which R = 0:5;
R
y = 0:5;
R
q = 0:1. For  we use 0.8, which reects a realistic degree of
interest-rate smoothing.11
We consider two types of shocks for our impulse responses, a technology shock, and a housing demand
shock. The latter can be interpreted as a house price shock, since it is directly transmitted to house prices.
We assume that technology, At, follows an autoregressive process with 0:9 persistence and a normally
distributed shock.12 We also assume that the weight of housing on the utility function is equal to its
value in the steady state plus a shock which follows an autoregressive process with 0:95 persistence.13
For the reactions parameters in the LTV rule we tentatively use 0:05 and perform a sensitivity analysis
to this value. Table 1 presents a summary of the parameter values used:
10This number is within the range of estimates in various studies, including Campbell and Mankiw (1989), which estimated
from consumer Euler equations the fraction of constrained agents in the economy.
11As in McCallum (2001).
12This high persistence value for technology shocks is consistent with what is commonly reported in the literature. Smets
and Wouters (2002) estimated a value of 0.822 for this parameter in Europe; Iacoviello and Neri (2010) estimated it as 0.93
for the US.
13The persistence of the shocks is consistent with the estimates in Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
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Table 1: Parameter Values
s :99 Discount Factor for Savers
b :98 Discount Factor for Borrowers
j :1 Weight of Housing in Utility Function
 2 Parameter associated with labor elasticity
kSS :9 Loan-to-value ratio
 :64 Labor share for Savers
X 1:2 Steady-state markup
 :75 Probability of not changing prices
A :9 Technology persistence
j :95 Housing demand shock persistence
 :8 Interest-Rate-Smoothing Parameter in Taylor Rule
R :5 Ination parameter in Taylor Rule
ky :05 Output parameter in LTV Rule
kq :05 House price parameter in LTV Rule
3.2 Business Cycle Properties
Table 2 presents the volatilities derived from the model with respect to those found in the data.14 We
nd that the model does pretty well in matching standard deviations of the main variables, and it is the
case for the three Taylor rules analysed. The standard deviation of ination is lower than the one found
in the data, especially when the Taylor rule responds only to ination. The model does particularly well
in terms of matching house price volatility.
14The standard deviations are presented for a one percent increase in technology. Data moments are taken from Iacoviello
and Neri (2010).
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Table 2: Business Cycle Properties
Model Data
Simple TR TR Ext TR
 (y) 2.01 1.88 1.85 2.17
 (q) 1.83 1.89 1.90 1.87
 () 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.40
 (R) 0.27 0.19 0.18 0.32
3.3 Impulse Responses
In order to gain some insight about the dynamics of the model, in this section, we simulate the impulse
responses of the baseline model given a supply shock (technology shock) and demand shock (housing
demand shock).
In the impulse responses, the solid line represents the situation when there is no macroprudential
policy. This is the benchmark. Then, in each gure, we compare this benchmark, solid line, with the
situation in which a macroprudential policy is represented by a Taylor-type rule for the LTV ratio that
responds to output and house prices. Notice that we have three di¤erent monetary policies:
-When the central bank responds to ination (Simple Taylor Rule).
-When the central bank responds to ination and output (Taylor Rule).
-When the central bank responds to ination, output, and house prices (Extended Taylor Rule).
The reason why we consider three types of Taylor rules is that, as pointed out by Iacoviello (2005),
a Taylor rule in which the output parameter is set to zero amplies the nancial accelerator mechanism
since the central bank does not intervene when output falls. Then, introducing a response to output
in the policy rule makes it more restrictive. If, additionally, the interest rate also responds to house
prices, the Taylor rule becomes even tougher. In some sense, we could interpret these extended rules as
being macroprudential by themselves, since they are constraining the nancial accelerator by increasing
the interest rates in booms and therefore constraining credit. Therefore, the introduction of a second
macroprudential tool could be redundant.
Therefore, the objective of this section is to compare the responses of the combination of these three
monetary policies and the macroprudential policy with respect to the benchmark for a demand shock
and a supply shock.
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3.3.1 Technology shock
Figure 1 shows impulse responses to a 2.24 percent standard deviation shock to technology for output,
borrowing, ination, interest rate, and house prices.15
The e¤ects of the shock for output are stronger when the simple Taylor rule is in place. When the
central bank follows the standard and the extended Taylor rules, the output expansion makes interest
rates not to go down as much as with the simple Taylor rule. This measure reduces the impact of the
shock. The macroprudential regulator reacts more strongly with respect to the benchmark when the
central bank keeps the simple Taylor rule. In all cases, the increase in the LTV helps to soften the e¤ects
of the shock in output.
The highest di¤erence appears in the borrowing with the simple TR. In this case, borrowers benet
from higher output and lower interest rate and they can borrow more. The rise in output activates the
LTV rule and the collateral constraint becomes tighter. Therefore, the e¤ects on borrowing of the shock
are not so strong. The macroprudential policy can help to moderate borrowing in all cases but is more
relevant in the simple TR.
Even if ination is decreasing in all cases, it is higher when the simple TR is in place. The reason is
because there is a demand impulse due to higher borrowing that leads to a higher ination in the simple
TR.
The interest rate reacts more in the simple TR because this rule reduces the interest rate only when
prices are lower. The TR and the extended TR react with a lower interest rate when prices go down
but the reduction is not so high because these Taylor rules respond also to a higher output with higher
interest rates. In all cases, the macroprudential policy causes a higher reduction of the interest rate,
greater with the simple TR, because ination decreases by more due to the fall in demand by borrowers.
Then, the interest rate drop is larger in this case.
House prices react like any other asset to the interest rate, then they increase even more when the
macroprudential policy is active because the interest rate decreases by more in this case.
Figure 2 presents the responses of the LTV ratio to the technology shock. We see here that there is
a conict between the monetary policy and the macroprudential policy. The macroprudential regulator
makes the LTV tighter to react to a higher output. However, the central bank is reducing the interest
rate with all TR due to lower prices. This lower interest rate expands more the output and this forces
the macroprudential regulator to reduce even more the LTV. The di¤erence is lower in the extended TR
15The standard deviation of the technology shock is estimated in Iacoviello (2005).
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to a technology shock. Macroprudential versus no macroprudential
where the interest rate does not fall as much because the central bank also responds to a higher output.
In contrast, the simple TR only reacts to prices and the conict is stronger.
3.3.2 Housing Demand Shock
We consider a housing demand shock of a 25% standard deviation. This would generate an increase of a
25 percent in house prices. In Figure 3, we observe the impulse response functions for output, borrowing,
ination, interest rate, and house prices.
In the case of the output, the increase in house prices directly a¤ects the collateral constraint and
borrowers are able to borrow more out of their housing collateral, which is worth more now. Wealth
e¤ects allow them consume both more houses and consumption goods. The increase in house prices is
therefore transmitted to the real economy and output increases. When we compare the case without
macroprudential policy (solid line) and with the macroprudential policy in place (dashed line), we nd
that in all three cases considered (simple TR, TR, and extended TR), the shock is moderated thanks
to the macroprudential policy. This is due to the fact that the macroprudential policy reacts to the
increase in the house prices reducing the LTV, restricting the credit in the economy. Therefore, a lower
LTV moderates the demand shock decreasing credit in the economy and reducing the increase in output.
There is a slight di¤erence in the magnitude of the response function for the output in the extended TR;
in this case, the central bank reacts directly to the shock in the house prices with a higher interest rate.
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Output does not increase as much as in the other two monetary policies, both with the macroprudential
policy and without it. Furthermore, all the Taylor rules respond to the higher ination produced by the
expansion of output with higher interest rates.
Borrowing is lower for the three monetary policy rules when the macroprudential policy is active: a
tighter LTV makes borrowers reduce their leverage.
In the case of ination, the macroprudential policy helps to control it in all cases. For the extended
TR, ination is even lower because the monetary policy reacts immediately to the shock with a higher
interest rate.
The impulse responses for interest rate are showing signicant di¤erences. When the macroprudential
policy is not active, the highest reaction appears in the extended TR because of the previously mentioned
direct reaction to the shock. Then, it follows the TR, because it reacts to the increase in output and
in ination. Finally, the lower response is in the simple TR when the central bank only increases
interest rate when ination emerges. In all cases, the reaction of the central bank is moderated when
the macroprudential policy is in place.
House pricesimpulse responses functions are lower when the macroprudential policy is not in place
because in this case the central bank reacts more in terms of the interest rate. Since the house price is
the price of an asset, a higher interest rate will reduce its price. The interest rate pushes house prices
down more strongly when the macroprudential rule is not active. Therefore, the boom is mitigated when
the macroprudential rule is in place.
Then, with a demand side shock, monetary and macroprudential policies reinforce each other because
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Figure 2: LTV response to a technology shock (macroprudential rule is active). Simple TR versus TR
and extended TR
both of them aim at cutting credit in the economy with di¤erent instruments. Impulse responses show
how, given the same shock, output, borrowing, ination and house price responses are softened by the
macroprudential measure. The interest rate responds more aggressively when the central bank reacts
with respect to more parameters in its Taylor rule and this has an impact in output, borrowing and
ination.
Figure 4 displays the response of the LTV to a housing demand shock. We see that both policies
go in the same direction. The macroprudential regulator cuts the LTV while interest rates go up, both
limiting the expansion of credit. We also observe that, in this case, when we have an extended TR, the
LTV does not need to respond in such a strong way as compared to the other two rules because monetary
policy is already helping the macroprudential regulator to control house prices and output deviations
from the steady state.
4 Welfare
4.1 Welfare Measure
To assess the normative implications of the di¤erent policies, we numerically evaluate the welfare derived
in each case. As discussed in Benigno and Woodford (2008), the two approaches that have recently been
used for welfare analysis in DSGE models include either characterizing the optimal Ramsey policy, or
solving the model using a second-order approximation to the structural equations for given policy and
then evaluating welfare using this solution. As in Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), we take this latter
17
Figure 3: Impulse responses to a housing demand shock. Macroprudential versus no macroprudential
approach to be able to evaluate the welfare of the two types of agents separately.16 The individual
welfare for savers and borrowers, respectively, as follows:
Ws;t  Et
1X
m=0
ms

logCs;t+m + j logHs;t+m   (Ns;t+m)



; (23)
Wb;t  Et
1X
m=0
mb

logCb;t+m + j logHb;t+m   (Nb;t+m)



; (24)
Following Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), we dene social welfare as a weighted sum of the individual
welfare for the di¤erent types of households:
Wt = (1  s)Ws;t + (1  b)Wb;t: (25)
Each agent´s welfare is weighted by her discount factor; respectively, so that the all the groups receive
the same level of utility from a constant consumption stream.
However, in order to make the results more intuitive, we present welfare changes in terms of con-
sumption equivalents. We use as a benchmark the welfare evaluated when the macroprudential policy is
not active and compare it with the welfare obtained when such policy is implemented. We are interested
16We used the software Dynare to obtain a solution for the equilibrium implied by a given policy by solving a second-order
approximation to the constraints, then evaluating welfare under the policy using this approximate solution, as in Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2004). See Monacelli (2006) for an example of the Ramsey approach in a model with heterogeneous
consumers.
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Figure 4: LTV response to a house price shock (macroprudential rule is active). Simple TR versus TR
and extended TR
in calculating the welfare benet of introducing a macroprudential policy, therefore, we convert the dif-
ference between those values in consumption equivalent units to obtain an understandable measure. The
consumption equivalent measure denes the constant fraction of consumption that households should
give away in order to obtain the benets of the macroprudential policy. Then, when there is a welfare
gain, households would be willing to pay in consumption units for the measure to be implemented be-
cause it is welfare improving. We present welfare results as the equivalent in consumption units of this
welfare improvement. The derivation of the welfare benets in terms of consumption equivalent units is
as follows:
CEs = exp

(1  s)
 
WMPs  W s
  1; (26)
CEb = exp

(1  b)
 
WMPb  W b
  1; (27)
CE = exp
 
WMPb  W b
  1: (28)
where the superscripts in the welfare values denote the benchmark case when macroprudential policies
are not introduced and the case in which they are, respectively.17
17We follow Ascari and Ropele (2009).
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Figure 5: Welfare gains from introducing Macroprudential Policy, given Taylor rule. Borrowers, Savers,
and Total
4.2 Welfare Analysis of the LTV rule, given Monetary Policy
In this section, we numerically evaluate welfare in the model. As in the impulse responses, we consider
three di¤erent cases for monetary policy; rst, a Taylor rule which responds just to ination, that is,
R = 0:5;
R
y = 0;
R
q = 0 (simple TR), second, a Taylor rule which responds to ination and output,
that is R = 0:5;
R
y = 0:5;
R
q = 0 (TR) and nally, a Taylor rule which responds to ination, output
and house prices, that is, R = 0:5;
R
y = 0:5;
R
q = 0:1 (Extended TR). For the macroprudential rule, in
order to simplify things and gain some insight, we restrict the analysis to the case in which both reaction
parameters are equal. In the next section, we relax this restriction and nd the optimal parameters.
Figures 5 and 6 show the welfare gains of introducing a macroprudential tool based on the LTV in
the economy, given the Taylor rule in place. Figure 5 shows three panels comparing the welfare e¤ects
for each agent and the total for each di¤erent Taylor rule, when the parameters of the LTV rule change.
Figure 6, in turn, compares the total welfare gain for the three Taylor rules.18
The conclusions we can obtain from the gures are the following. Using both policy measures at the
same time is unambiguously welfare enhancing. Welfare of borrowers increases with the introduction of
the macroprudential rule because tightening the collateral constraint avoids situations of overindebtness
in which debt repayments are a burden for them and can benet from more nancial stability in the
economy. Notice that borrowers have a collateral constraint which is always binding and this does not
18Welfare units are presented in percent.
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Figure 6: Total welfare gains from introducing Macroprudential Policy, given Taylor rule
allow them make consumption smoothing.19 A more stable nancial system smooths their consumption
path thus mitigating the negative e¤ects of the collateral constraint. This welfare gain is at the expense of
savers, who lose from having this measure in the economy, given that they are not nancially constrained.
However, the borrowers welfare gain compensates the loss of the savers and globally, the measure is
welfare increasing. We also see that welfare increases by more, the larger the response of the LTV to
house prices and output is, but up to a point in which welfare stops increasing. Nevertheless, if we
compare across Taylor rules, we see that for the standard and the extended ones, welfare gains are not
as large as in the case in which the central bank has only one objective. The reason is that, as we have
seen, introducing a positive output and house price reaction to the interest rate restricts the nancial
accelerator e¤ect in the economy, then, it is a macroprudential policy by itself. Therefore, introducing
an extra macroprudential policy, although it helps stabilizing the nancial system, can be redundant.
Then, we can conclude that the central bank, by an appropriate combination of parameter values in
the Taylor rule could do the job of a macroprudential regulator. However, the goals of the central bank
should be extended to not only to keeping ination low but also to have a stable nancial system. The
open question here would be if these two objectives could be in conict at some point and it would be
better to have a separate institution in charge of the stability of the nancial system.
19See Rubio (2011), equation (19), for further discussion on the issue.
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4.3 Optimal LTV rule, given Monetary Policy
In this subsection, we optimize the parameters of the LTV rule taking the Taylor rule parameters as given.
This would be a special case in which regulators act in a non coordinated way. The macroprudential
regulator would nd the best response taken as given the parameters of the Taylor rule.20 Table 3 shows
results:
Table 3: Optimal Macroprudential, for given TR
Simple TR TR Extended TR
ky 0.001 0.001 0.001
kq 0.303 0.199 0.165
Welfare gain 30.864 1.224 0.651
We see that in order to maximize welfare, the LTV rule should respond relatively more aggressive to
house prices than to output. In fact, the output response is negligible. We observe that the house price
response is larger when the Taylor rule is only focusing on ination because there is no room for nancial
stabilization in monetary policy. However, when the Taylor rule is extended to respond to output and
house prices, the macroprudential policy does not need to be as aggressive as in the other cases because
monetary policy is contributing to the same goal. Another issue to notice, as we saw in the previous
section, is that welfare gains from introducing a macroprudential tool are larger in the case of the simple
Taylor rule.21
5 Optimal Monetary and Macroprudential Policies
In this section, we nd the optimal combination of policy parameters that maximizes welfare. We take as
a benchmark the model with monetary policy, when the optimized Taylor rule responds to ination and
output, which is the standard case. Then, we consider two cases: one in which the Taylor rule is extended
to include house prices and there is no LTV rule, so that it is a Taylor rule with a macroprudential
component but just one instrument, the interest rate; and one in which we optimize both the Taylor
rule and the LTV rule, so that there are two instruments, the LTV and the interest rate. This latter
20To characterize the full solution of the non-coordinated game one should nd the best response of the macroprudential
regulator given di¤erent combinations of monetary policies and vice versa. The intersection between these two best responses
would be the Nash equilibrium.
21Note that welfare gains are large because we are considering as a benchmark a case in which monetary policy is not
optimized. Next section considers monetary policy optimization.
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case would correspond to a coordinated game. In this case, we can think of a single regulator with two
instruments (interest rate and LTV) and three objectives (ination, output and nancial stability), or
two regulators that perfectly coordinate their actions.
Table 4 shows results of the policy optimization. The rst column shows the optimal parameters of
the standard Taylor rule that responds to output and ination, that we will take as our benchmark. The
second column presents the optimal parameters of the extended Taylor rule that responds to output,
ination and house prices and displays welfare gains with respect to the benchmark. Finally, the third
column shows the optimal mix of parameters for both macroprudential and monetary policy, considering
the extended TR for monetary policy, since it is the most general case. It also shows the welfare gains
with respect to the benchmark monetary policy only scenario.22
Table 4: Optimal Macroprudential and Monetary Policy
TR (Benchmark) Extended TR LTV and Extended TR
ky - - 0.08
kq - - 0.43
R 15.1 15.5 2.3
Ry 8.2 8.2 0.02
Rq - 0.24 0
Welfare Gain
Total - 0.0006 0.645
Savers - -0.016 1.062
Borrowers - 0.017 -0.201
The benchmark optimized Taylor rule (rst column) is one that responds aggressively against ination
and output. If we allow for house prices in the Taylor rule (second column, extended TR), we observe that
it is optimal for the central bank to have a positive response to them. This case would be equivalent
to having the central bank do the job of a macroprudential regulator but with just one instrument,
the interest rate. We can see that there are welfare gains from introducing house prices in the central
bank rule. Gains are coming especially from borrowers, who enjoy a more stable nancial system without
compromising output and ination response. Nevertheless, savers are slightly worse o¤, since they would
prefer that the central bank focused just on ination stabilization and did not include more objectives
22Note that the standard deviation of the LTV instrument is 2.4011.
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in its policy.
When we optimize over all the parameters and nd the coordinated policy welfare gains with respect
to the benchmark are larger (third column). In this case, gains come from the savers side. Savers are
better o¤ in a situation in which monetary policy uses its instrument to ght against ination and the
macroprudential regulator cares about nancial stability with a di¤erent instrument. However, borrowers
prefer the previous situation, in which nancial stability is controlled through interest rates so that they
can benet from this scenario without tightening the collateral constraint. We see that the optimal
macroprudential rule responds relatively more aggressively to house prices than to output because house
prices appear directly in the collateral constraint and are responsible for nancial stability. If we allow
for monetary policy to respond to output, the optimal response is very small. Nevertheless, if we also
allow the central bank to set interest rates responding to house prices, in order to enhance nancial
stability, it is not optimal to do so.
These results suggest that the optimal monetary policy is to ght against ination and leave the
nancial stability goal for a macroprudential regulator. Even if we allow for the extended Taylor rule to
take place, the optimal thing to do for the central bank is not to respond to house prices, this seems to
be the job of the macroprudential regulator.
In conclusion, the central bank could use the interest rate to stabilize house prices and therefore the
nancial system. However, optimal policy analysis suggests that it is preferable to leave this objective
to a macroprudential regulator with a di¤erent instrument.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have aimed at analyzing the impact of macroprudential policies both on the main
economic variables and on welfare. In particular, we consider a macroprudential rule on the LTV ratio.
We nd that introducing a macroprudential tool mitigates the e¤ects of booms in the economy by
restricting credit. We also nd that monetary policy and macroprudential policy may enter in conict
when shocks come from the supply side of the economy.
From a normative point of view, we nd several interesting results: First, unambiguously, when
monetary policy and a rule for the LTV ratio interact, the introduction of this macroprudential measure
is welfare enhancing. Second, welfare gains increase when the LTV responds more aggressively to changes
in output and house prices. Third, welfare gains are larger if the central bank is responding only to
24
ination. The reason is that this extended Taylor rule could be considered macroprudential by itself
because it restricts the nancial accelerator e¤ect. Then, introducing an extra macroprudential measure
may be redundant.
Finally, we calculate the combination of policy parameters that maximizes welfare. We nd that the
optimal LTV rule is one that responds relatively more aggressively to house prices than output deviations.
Results also show that welfare is maximized when the central bank focuses on ghting against ination
and leaves the goal of ensuring a stable nancial system to a di¤erent institution.
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Appendix
Main Equations
1
Cs;t
= sEt

Rt
t+1Cs;t+1

; (29)
wst = (Ns;t)
 1Cs;t; (30)
j
Hs;t
=
1
Cs;t
qt   sEt 1
Cs;t+1
qt+1: (31)
1
Cb;t
= bEt

Rt
t+1Cb;t+1

+ tRt; (32)
wb;t = (Nb;t)
 1Cb;t; (33)
j
Hb;t
=
1
Cb;t
qt   bEt

1
Cb;t+1
qt+1

  btktEt (qt+1t+1) : (34)
Et
Rt
t+1
bt = ktEtqt+1Hb;t; (35)
Cb;t + qtHb;t +
Rt 1bt 1
t
= qtHb;t 1 + wb;tLb;t + bt; (36)
ws;t =
1
Xt

Yt
Ns;t
; (37)
wb;t =
1
Xt
(1  ) Yt
Nb;t
; (38)
bt = Etbt+1    bxt + ut (39)
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Ws;t  Et
1X
m=0
ms

logCs;t+m + j logHs;t+m   (Ns;t+m)



; (40)
Wb;t  Et
1X
m=0
mb

logCb;t+m + j logHb;t+m   (Nb;t+m)



; (41)
Wt = (1  s)Ws;t + (1  b)Wb;t: (42)
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